

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Cultural Inequalities in Cross-national Perspective

A Secondary Analysis of Survey Data for the 1980s

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1. *Introduction and Research Questions*

François Mitterrand, the first socialist President of France since the second world war, recently stated: "Faciliter l'accès de tous aux oeuvres, aux savoirs, d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, telle est la première ambition des grands projets" (Mitterrand 1989: 5). Apparently, different social strata do not participate equally in high culture, be this is a matter of viewing paintings in art museums, attending the opera or reading library books, and the extent to which the lower social strata are underrepresented in cultural audiences can be changed by government policies. These ideas are not new, nor restricted to France. They were expressed, for instance, in the Netherlands before the second world war by the social democrat Boekman (1939). But the cultural activities undertaken by the French state during the 1980s were surely more spectacular than those of any other government at that time.

For most contemporary industrial nations the positive relation between such factors as education and income, on the one hand, and reading literature, going to the theater, attending concerts of classical music etc. on the other, has been amply demonstrated by survey research. Cultural participation indeed is a socially unequally distributed phenomenon. However, until now the question of whether this relation is about the same in all industrial nations or weaker in countries governed by parties generally favorable to high culture, has remained an open one. The one major comparison of cultural inequalities in industrial nations is by

Bourdieu and Darbel (1969), and involves museum visitors in France, Greece, the Netherlands, and Poland. It did not yield any conclusion about differences between countries.

This paper addresses the question of similarities or differences in cultural participation between present-day industrial nations in two different ways. First, for 5 countries in a multivariate model the effects on an index of cultural activities are estimated of a person's education, income, and father's education, and tests for dissimilarities between nations are performed. Second, for 17 countries the bivariate strength of the relationship between a person's education and frequency of theater attendance is established, after which an attempt is made to explain any differences between countries in the strength of this relation by invoking the right-left orientation of its government and other country characteristics. Whereas the first empirical exercise involves various forms of cultural participation, several personal background characteristics, and a low number of countries, the second one includes a high number of countries but only one cultural activity and one background characteristic.

2. *Theoretical Background and Predictions*

Inequality or stratification is one of sociology's major questions, and this question has often been divided into various subproblems. Among the more frequently treated subproblems are income disparities (do left-wing governments decrease income differentials?), social mobility (does comprehensive schooling make for more intergenerational occupational mobility?), and connubium or heterogamy (has the extent to which like marries like decreased in the course of time?). This paper treats questions about the strength of the relation between personal background and participation in various forms of high culture not only as yet another part of the general sociological problem of inequality, but also as a particularly interesting, although somewhat neglected, subproblem of it.

Longstanding hypotheses in sociology hold that industrial nations, if not already much the same in their pattern of stratification (Lipset, Bendix 1959), are converging towards inequalities that are similar and small (Kerr et al. 1960). However, recent research has shown that these nations continue to differ in income disparities (Sawyer 1976), social mobility (Ganzeboom, Luijkx, Treiman 1989), and educational heterogamy (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Stratification is weaker in industrial nations having attained a higher level of economic development (say, West Germany) than in those still at a lower level (Ireland). There is evidence that prolonged social democratic rule (Sweden), net of economic development, makes for smaller income differences (Hewitt 1977), more social mobility (Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero 1982), and more educational heterogamy (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). One qualification is that immigrant countries (Cana-

da), despite their rightist politics, display more social mobility (Heath 1981). Findings on communist rule (Hungary) have been less equivocal: income differences are smaller (Connor 1979) and social mobility is higher (Heath 1981), but educational heterogamy seems less widespread (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Because of the necessarily small number of industrial countries involved (about twenty) and the less than desirable comparability of the data, these findings remain preliminary. The issue of whether politics makes a difference is far from being settled.

The first hypothesis to be tested in this paper, therefore, holds that in industrial nations the relation between personal-background factors and cultural participation is about the same. Upon rejection of that null hypothesis, two alternative ones are tested. They are obtained by simple generalization from research on other aspects of inequality. The first says that communism, social democracy, and immigration weaken the relation between a person's social characteristics and cultural participation. The other holds that the higher the economic development of an industrial country, the weaker the relation between the background characteristics and cultural activities of its citizens.

These two hypotheses about the effects of country characteristics lean strongly on the assumption that a person's behavior is determined by her or his resources, and the assumption that economic development and government determine the financial resources persons have at their disposal. Higher economic development, with its rising general standard of living, lowers financial barriers to cultural participation, and so do social democratic and communist governments. A policy of relatively free immigration also lowers barriers to high culture.

It is against the background of these assumptions that the French sociologist Bourdieu (1979) developed an alternative for the perhaps all too easy prediction that economic development and egalitarian politics make for smaller cultural inequalities. The government of an industrial nation may have vast powers, but it is not all-powerful. People have a strong tendency to mark themselves off from others, and if members of the higher strata can no longer use certain resources to that effect because of governmental measures, they will use others. If financial obstacles no longer keep a society's lower strata from entering higher education, members of the upper strata will transfer to their children more cultural resources making for school success (De Graaf 1986). Also, if upward mobility does increase, members of the upper strata resort to a marriage strategy making for the pooling of resources — that is, to more homogamy — in order to maintain their position (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Despite state action, inequalities persist because elites employ compensatory strategies.

The predictions inspired by Bourdieu to be tested in this paper are about yet another compensatory strategy. If those with higher education lose ground because of smaller income disparities prompted by economic development or

left-wing politics, those with higher education can no longer distinguish themselves by material consumption. Under this condition, participation in high culture becomes a more attractive option for gaining distinction. Financial barriers against the cultural activities of the lower strata may have been weakened, but these strata still lack the competencies for appreciating Culture. Thus, the higher a country's level of economic development, the stronger will be the relation between the education of its inhabitants and their cultural activity. Further: in countries with a social democratic or communist government, the relation between a person's education and cultural participation will become reinforced. Finally: in countries where the relation between education and income is stronger, the connection net of income between a person's education and cultural participation will be weaker.

Since these Bourdieu-inspired predictions are contrary to those made on the basis of conventional arguments about economical development and left-wing politics, questions about differences between industrial countries with respect to cultural inequalities are all the more interesting. The following sections seek to test the predictions outlined here.

By applying Bourdieu's notion that compensatory strategies make for the reproduction of inequality to cultural participation in industrial nations, it is not suggested that high culture never served as a status symbol in pre-industrial societies, or that this more specific notion is foreign to historians. In fact it is prevalent, especially in art-historical studies detailing the life style of a country's upper classes. Thus Watkins (1990: 209) holds in a recent study on style in Jane Austen's England that with the changing distribution of wealth and increasing social mobility, land and money were no longer clear indications of status. Watkins adds that ever greater emphasis was therefore laid on the qualities that distinguished a "true" gentleman, regardless of pedigree: a capacity for informed discourse on a variety of subjects, and a discerning appreciation of the arts. The historically inclined sociologist Elias (1939) developed another concrete hypothesis about compensatory strategies employed by those "established" against outsiders: the European nobility, when losing its military powers with the advent of the absolute state at the beginning of modern times, maintained its social position by sharpening its standards of polite behavior.

As indicated, this paper restricts itself to industrial nations. Thus the word "industrial" is not used in its narrow historical sense ("the industrial revolution"), as pertaining to England in the period between 1760 and 1830 with all its mechanical inventions. In accordance with current usage in general sociology (Lenski, Lenski, Nolan 1991) it is held to comprise every society relying on inanimate energy. Current "post-industrial" societies are treated as industrial societies going through yet another round of innovations based on inanimate energy.

3. *Income, Education, and Cultural Participation in Five Countries*

This section reports on a secondary analysis of surveys on cultural participation undertaken in five industrial nations around 1980. The countries are Czechoslovakia (year of survey: 1984), Denmark (1976), the Netherlands (1977), Hungary (1982), and the United States (1982). Note that two communist countries will be studied (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), one country with a strong social democratic tradition (Denmark), one with a tradition of immigration (the United States), and one middle-of-the-road (the Netherlands). The sample thus includes all types of polities deemed pertinent. Computer tapes for these surveys were obtained from national data-archives. Given this number of countries, the analysis to be performed is at least on a par with that undertaken by Bourdieu and Darbel (1969), the only major comparative study on cultural participation.

3.1. *Data*

All data sets contain indicators for several cultural activities. The exact wording of the items and the number of items differ from survey to survey, and it would be tedious to detail them here. Suffice to say that they pertain to such matters as attending the theater, listening to classical music, and buying literature. Within each of the countries, the intercorrelation between the several items is high, indicating that respondents can be scaled according to their general tendency to participate in high culture. The scores of one individual on all items for a country were combined into an index for cultural participation. All data sets also contained information on respondent's age, education, father's education, and household income. Note that a person's financial resources are not measured by personal income, but more appropriately by household income. A person's cultural resources are indicated by education, but also by her or his father's education. Correlation matrices are presented in Appendix 1.

3.2. *Analysis: Five Nations Compared*

Table 1 presents the results for a multiple regression analysis that predicts cultural participation in each country separately and all countries combined on the basis of the four background characteristics mentioned. Coefficients range from +1 (a perfect positive connection between, say, education and cultural participation), by way of zero (no connection, no social inequality in cultural participation), to -1 (a perfect negative relation). First, the "average cultural participation model" (that constrains effects to be equal in all five countries) clearly brings out the pronounced influence of respondent's education compared to the other variables in the model. In all countries, respondent's education is the most important factor explaining cultural participation, and the effect of education is about three times larger than that of household income. Cultural inequali-

ties between educational categories are larger than those between income categories. Second, net of other factors, household income and father's education still significantly account for cultural consumption, with that of father's education being somewhat more important (but not for all countries) than that of household income. This finding attests to the potency of cultural resources. Third, the effect of age in three out of five countries is larger than that of household income. In four countries, older persons participate more in high culture, the Netherlands being the exception. This finding underlines the unimportance of financial resources for cultural participation.

As to the question of whether social inequalities in cultural participation are similar for all nations, Table 1 does show that effects of household income on cultural consumption are equal. However, the hypothesis that the effect of respondents's education on cultural participation does not differ between countries has to be rejected. So has the hypothesis that the effect of father's education on cultural consumption is equal. The effect of age cannot be regarded as equal either. Since the effect of household income is relatively small, it can safely be maintained that the five industrial countries strongly differ with respect to social inequalities in cultural participation.

Table 1 Multivariate regressions model for social inequalities in cultural participation in five countries; standardized coefficients

	average	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Denmark	Netherlands	USA
respondent's age	.031	.110	.084	.086	-.099	.080
father's education	.140	.190	.163	.101	.169	.060
respondent's education	.337	.239	.482	.327	.293	.459
household income	.100	.095	.076	.076	.131	.104
R^2		.128	.362	.165	.259	.288

test of differences:				
- equal effect of household income	4 df	9	Chi^2	not significant
- equal effect of age	4 df	148	Chi^2	significant
- equal effect of education	4 df	49	Chi^2	significant
- equal effect of father's education	4 df	164	Chi^2	significant

One Bourdieu-like hypothesis holds that the educated redress a lower financial return from education by stronger cultural participation (a lower yield presumably caused by economic development or leftist politics). If a higher income less conclusively marks off educated persons, the educated become more cultured. Given the finding that countries differ as regards social inequalities in cultural activities and given this hypothesis, the pivotal question is whether in nations where the effects of education on income are weaker, the effects of education on cultural consumption (after discounting the effects of other background factors) are stronger. If that hypothesis is corroborated, evidence has been found in favor of compensatory strategies.

To test this hypothesis, the ranking of countries according to the strength of the relation between education and household income ("the financial returns from education") is to be compared with their ranking according to the effect of education, net of three other background factors, on cultural consumption. It is also useful to compare the first ranking with the ranking of countries according to the zero-order correlation between education and cultural participation. Table 2 contains these rankings. The first and third column in Table 2 are taken from Appendix 1, the second one has been selected from Table 1.

Table 2 A comparison of (a) the zero-order correlation between education and household income, (b) the third-order correlation between education and cultural participation, and (c) the zero-order correlation between education and cultural participation for five industrial nations (rankings)

	(a)		(b)		(c)	
Czechoslovakia	.193	(1)	.239	(1)	.304	(1)
Denmark	.287	(2)	.327	(3)	.389	(2)
Hungary	.430	(4)	.482	(5)	.580	(5)
Netherlands	.408	(3)	.293	(2)	.444	(3)
United States	.480	(5)	.459	(4)	.520	(4)

Starting from this hypothesis, for Table 2 inverted rankings are expected: a country high in the first column is predicted to be low in the second and third one, and a country that is low in the first ranking should be high in the second and third column. However, Table 2 shows that rankings accord pretty well: in general, if a country is higher in the ranking depicted in the first column, it is higher in the ranking in the second and third columns too. There are two single-step inversions when comparing the first and second column and one single-step inversion when

comparing the first and third column, and that is all. All this amounts to a disconfirmation of the hypothesis that a smaller financial return is offset by more cultural participation.

Several caveats qualify this negative conclusion. The first is that cultural participation, although measured by an index of several indicators, is not measured in all countries in the same way. In fact, the negative effect of age on cultural participation for the Netherlands might be traced to a peculiarity in the Dutch index. An analysis employing a more comparable index or indicator of cultural participation seems desirable. The second rider is that the number of countries compared is extremely small. The two communist countries appear to differ a lot among themselves, making it awkward to regard the other countries as typical for their kind. An analysis for a higher number of countries is in order. The adage that a disconfirmed hypothesis should not be too hastily discarded seems applicable. The analysis to be reported in the next section pertains to one comparable indicator for cultural participation for all countries and to a decidedly higher number of countries.

4. *Education and Theatergoing in 17 Countries*

This section seeks to establish and explain the relation between a person's education and one indicator of cultural participation in 17 industrial countries in the 1980s. Of all possible indicators for cultured leisure, that of attending plays in theaters was chosen. This choice was one of expediency; it was estimated that for a high number of industrial countries a table could be found that crosses education and frequency of theatergoing. Of all possible personal background characteristics, education was singled out. The prime argument for this choice holds that the enduring effects of education are well-attested (Hyman, Wright, Reed 1975), and that in the previous section education proved its mettle as the most important variable predictive of cultural activities (see also Ganzeboom 1989).

4.1. *Data on Education and Theatergoing*

For various industrial nations, reports of empirical research on high culture were ransacked, yielding several useful tables. In addition, data-archives in various industrial countries containing computer tapes of social surveys were requested to provide a tabulation. That yielded valuable material too. This paper uses 17 tables, each pertaining to a different industrial nation, but almost always to the 1980s. Given the number of nations that by conventional criteria are deemed industrial, 24 to be exact (Lenski, Lenski, Nolan 1991: 248), this is a good catch. The omissions are East Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Switzerland. A table for Japan was obtained, but given the different cultural

history of this industrial nation, it was not included. We are happy to have found tables for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and although no table was procured for the whole of the Soviet Union, a table for Estonia alone was deemed to be useful. A run-down of the tables is given in Appendix 2.

After choosing the tables to be analyzed, decisions were made on how to compare them. Four decisions are mentioned. The first one was to contrast all people who did not attend the theater in the year preceding the survey with those who did so at least once. This choice was the natural one given the high percentage of persons who never watched a play. The second decision was to contrast those having received more than secondary education with all others. This contrast is nicely in line with hypotheses about the way the upper strata of society distinguish themselves from those lower down the social scale. The third decision was to make an additional contrast, between those with primary education only and all those having attained a higher level of education. This decision was taken on two grounds. Given the small number of countries to be compared, the data on one contrast provide a check upon the conclusions arrived at by the other contrast. In addition, if the cultural policies of governments are successful, they should show up in both contrasts.

Fourthly, an odds ratio was computed for all resulting two-by-two tables for the relation between education and theatergoing. This measure is the product of the frequency in the upper left-hand cell of such a table with the frequency in its lower right-hand cell divided by the product of the upper right-hand cell frequency with the lower left-hand cell frequency {(a*d)/(b*c)}. There is a special reason why the relation between education and watching plays was characterized by an odds ratio. One of the technical difficulties of research on inequality and stratification is how to devise a measure for differences between social strata with respect to some behavioral frequency that is free from the effects of the overall frequency of that act in the total population. It has been pointed out that odds ratios do that job (Heath 1981: Appendix 2; Heath, Jowell, Curtice 1985: 31). If an odds ratio equals unity, there are no inequalities between the levels of education contrasted; the more they are above unity, the more the higher level is overrepresented (and, in the unlikely case, the more they are below unity, the more the higher level is underrepresented). By employing odds ratios, differences between countries in the social distribution of cultural activity are freed from interference by differences between countries in the general level of cultural activity.

For the 17 countries, the odds ratio involving the contrast between the highest level of education and all other levels correlated 0.36 with the odds ratio for the contrast between the lowest level of education and all other levels. This result is not discouraging, but underlines the very tentative nature of each and every result of this paper.



4.2. *Data on Country Characteristics*

This paper not only seeks to establish differences between industrial nations in the connection between education and theatergoing, but also seeks to explain them by invoking country characteristics. Given the state of the art of research on income disparities, social mobility, and educational heterogamy, data for four country features have been used: level of economic development, whether or not the country in its recent past was governed by the communist party, whether or not its government included social democrats over a long period, and whether or not it had a tradition of immigration.

Australia, Canada, and the United States were classified as countries with a tradition of immigration, all other industrial countries featured in this paper were not. Communist countries were Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were regarded as social democratic. Data on a country's level of economic development in 1980 were taken from Summers and Heston (1988). The data pertain to per capita gross national product in dollars, and do not employ exchange rates, but purchasing power parities. To obtain a value for Estonia, 20% was added to the value for the Soviet Union. (This decision was based upon Anonymous 1991.) An attempt to quantify the amount of money governments spent on high culture remained unsuccessful. In addition, no sufficiently long and useful list of theater-ticket prices in various countries was found.

To test Bourdieu's hypotheses about the reproduction of inequality by way of compensatory strategies, additional variables were included on income disparities within a country, social mobility, and educational heterogamy. Data on income disparities were found in World Bank (1990: 236-37). Two measures were chosen: the percentage of total net household income going to the richest 10% of all households, and the percentage of total net household income going to the poorest 20% of all households. Values for Czechoslovakia were taken from Vecernik (1987). Morrison's (1984) data for the Soviet Union were held to apply to Estonia. Values for Austria are missing.

Data on social mobility and educational heterogamy were taken from Ultee and Luijkx (1990: 132, 135, 141; where possible, data for the 1980s were chosen). The data for social mobility are the odds ratios for the movement across the line between manual and non-manual occupations. The higher the odds ratio, the less mobility there is. The data for educational heterogamy are the step parameter of a loglinear model for a 4*4 table. The higher the step parameter, the more widespread educational heterogamy. Mobility and heterogamy data are not available for Estonia. Appendix 2 contains all data to be analyzed.

4.3. *Is the Relation between Education and Theatergoing Similar in all Industrial Nations?*

The first question is whether the relation between education and frequency of theatergoing is similar or different for the 17 industrial nations. Table 3 presents for each country the odds ratio for the contrast between the primary-school educated and all others, and for the contrast between persons having more than secondary education and those having less. In the first case, the average odds ratio is 4.1, with a standard deviation of 2.5 (61%); in the second case the mean is 5.0, with a standard deviation of 1.3 (26%). On this basis, the hypothesis that cultural inequalities are similar in industrial societies has to be rejected.

Table 3 Odds ratios for the relation between education and going to the theater (a) for the contrast between those with the highest level of education and all others, (b) for the contrast between those with the lowest level of education and all others

	(a)	(b)
communist countries		
Czechoslovakia	6.0	2.8
Estonia	3.7	5.0
Hungary	6.5	10.5
Poland	6.9	5.0
average	5.8	5.8
immigration countries		
Australia	4.6	3.5
Canada	2.4	3.6
United States	5.0	9.3
average	4.0	5.5
social democratic countries		
Austria	6.3	5.1
Denmark	4.8	1.7
Finland	5.8	2.5
Norway	4.0	3.4
Sweden	3.8	2.2
average	4.9	3.0
other countries		
Belgium	5.5	2.5
France	6.3	4.4
Germany, F.R.	5.3	3.6
Netherlands	4.0	1.6
United Kingdom	3.4	2.8
average	4.9	3.0
all countries overall average	5.0	4.1

4.4. *Do Country Characteristics Explain Differences in the Relation between Education and Theatergoing?*

The next question is to what extent the relation between the education of an industrial nation's inhabitants and the frequency with which they attend the theater can be accounted for by such country characteristics as a communist or social democratic government, or a tradition of immigration. Are cultural inequalities smaller in communist, social democratic, and immigration countries? And are they smaller in communist countries than in social democratic ones?

The averages in Table 3 make clear that conventional hypotheses about the effects of polity on various types of inequalities are disconfirmed for the case of cultural inequalities. Communist states do deviate from other polities — by showing *larger cultural inequalities*. In addition, there is some tendency for immigration countries to have larger cultural inequalities too. Conservative and social democratic nations are on a par with respect to cultural inequalities. To some extent politics does make a difference — but not the expected one.

Table 4 The regression of odds ratios for the relation between education and theatergoing on political and economic country characteristics; odds ratios (a) for the contrast between those with the highest level of education and all others, (b) for the contrast between those with the lowest level of education and all others; standardized regression coefficients (significant at the .20 level)*

	(a)	(b)
immigration	-.28	.40*
communism	.29	.51*
R^2	.21	.31
adjusted R^2	.10	.21
economic development	-.45	.06
immigration	-.17	.38*
communism	-.04	.55*
R^2	.31	.28
adjusted R^2	.10	.16
economic development	-.41*	-.40*
immigration	-.17	.45*
R^2	.27	.21
adjusted R^2	.17	.09
economic development	-.56*	.31
communism	-.08	.66*
R^2	.25	.20
adjusted R^2	.14	.08

The question to be raised now is whether the findings just reported for political factors are also obtained if the relation between economic development and one type of cultural inequality and that between economic development and polity is taken into account. To answer this question, several multiple regressions were run. Table 4 contains results. Judging on the basis of adjusted R^2 and significant coefficients, at least for the odds ratio contrasting those with the lowest education with all others, the conclusion about immigration and communism just stated still appears to hold. Adding economic development to the regression equation does not improve its fit. However, for the odds ratio contrasting persons with the highest education with all others, economic development appears to be the only pertinent variable. Although one simple overall conclusion is not possible, conventional hypotheses about the consequences of political variables for cultural inequalities are disconfirmed.

4.5. *The Relationship between the Effect of Education on Theatergoing and other Measures for Societal Inequality*

Although the findings just reported confirm Bourdieu's hypothesis about compensatory strategies of reproduction, this support may be regarded as weak. After all, data for only one strategy of reproduction have been used. A stronger test ascertains the relation between the type of cultural inequality featured in this section, on the one hand, and income disparities, father-son occupational mobility, and educational heterogamy on the other hand. Table 5 presents pertinent findings.

Table 5 The regression of odds ratios for the relation between education and theatergoing on other measures for societal inequality; odds ratios (a) for the contrast between those with the lowest level of education and all others; standardized regression coefficients (significant at the .20 level)*

	(a)	(b)
father-son occupational mobility	.19	-.42*
educational heterogamy	.00	-.46*
R^2	.04	.28
adjusted R^2	-.10	.18
income share richest 10%	-.35*	-.06
R^2	.12	.00
adjusted R^2	.05	-.06

Again, the two measures for the relation between education and theatergoing do not yield the same results. Indeed, of three significant coefficients one has the wrong sign. The lower the income share of the richest 10%, the more theatergoing by those with the highest level of education surpasses that of all others. This is as predicted following Bourdieu. In addition, the more social mobility, the larger the differences in theatergoing between those with the lowest education and other persons. This is in Bourdieu's vein too. But finally: the more educational heterogamy, the smaller the differences in theatergoing between persons with the lowest education and others. This is not as expected if Bourdieu-like compensations occur.

5. *Conclusions and Speculations*

By analyzing two different data sets, this paper found ample support for the hypothesis that industrial nations differ in social inequalities with respect to cultural participation. These differences cannot be explained by hypotheses holding that inequalities are smaller in communist, social democratic, and immigrant nations. There is some support for the Bourdieu-inspired hypothesis that if the position of the established — as measured by their income share, by social mobility, and by educational heterogamy — is weaker, social inequalities in cultural participation are larger. It is repeated that this support is only slight. Future research on the questions addressed in this paper is worthwhile, and it is best pursued by comparing as many countries as possible using as simple measures for cultural inequalities as possible.

The findings made in this paper are not very favorable regarding the tenability of hypotheses inspired by Bourdieu's work for industrial nations during the 1980s. Yet, although they are not fully true, it would be rash to maintain that they are completely false. It is in this spirit that the final speculations of this paper on "1992" employ some of Bourdieu's hypotheses once more. The argument is that because of Western Europe's economic integration, its cultural hierarchy becomes extended and less accessible.

Even Eurosceptics sense that there is something wrong with popular worries about the end of national cultures in an economically integrated Western Europe. Mrs. Thatcher, in her speech in Bruges in 1988, stated that the cathedrals and literature of Great Britain show how much of British cultural wealth is derived from the other countries of Europe. Since cultures never were isolated to begin with, questions about their disappearance pose the issue poorly. Is the underlying issue, rather, whether economic unification makes for the further amalgamation of national cultures, and if so, which national culture will become dominant? This question is still not very good. If societies are stratified, then cultural unity

within any one country — a single "national culture" — is a fiction: besides the dominant Culture of the upper strata (which finds intermittent adherence elsewhere in society), other subcultures exist which are rooted in the lower rungs of the social scale.

Even then, the question whether the cultures of the upper strata of the EC-member countries will grow to resemble one another and whether those of their lower strata will do so too, is still rather vague. Merton (1957) stated that in societies like those of Western Europe the lower strata have a way of life focused on the here and now, whereas the upper strata have a more cosmopolitan life style. The Culture of the upper strata goes back farther in time, anticipates future developments, and crosses borders more often. Thus the more precise question is whether economic unification will decrease or increase the gap in cosmopolitism between the cultures of the upper and lower strata of the emerging West European supranational state.

Let us try to answer this question. Even in modern society there is a fine and thin line between something that is distinct and something that is distinctive. In every society people vie for the esteem of others. Given that there is only one number one, demand always exceeds supply, and this situation makes people spend more and more time and energy on competing for the same amount of esteem. This explanation of inflation is applicable to anything that is valued by society, including fashion, interior decoration, architecture, and painting (Gombrich 1979).

At present, Western Europe's national authorities are fuelling rivalries in the field of high culture. National orchestras tour the world, and state museums are hoarding treasures and putting on exhibitions. The completion of the EC may well foster this battle of the giants. Cultural elites, out of fear of losing the prime position they have in their own country, will press for protection by their national government. Out of fear of lower national prestige, some authorities will give in. On top of national high cultures, not very accessible to persons with less education and to those living outside cultural centers, arises a supranational high culture that is far removed from highly educated persons living in those national capitals that lose the new race.

Since even in cultural matters the first blow is half the battle, Paris may become the permanent cultural capital of Europe. Here for several decades, presidents have been waging a prestige battle by cultural means. "Les grands projets" will become bigger, larger, and vaster. The cosmopolitan nature of French Megaculture transpires from the fact that the architect of the Opéra Bastille is a Canadian from Uruguay and that the Opéra's musical director was born in South Korea and trained in the United States. And what if Berlin becomes the capital of a united East and West Germany? A change in the European system

of economic and political power in favor of Germany, will intensify the competition for prestige between France and Germany. At present, West Germany's new museum buildings harmoniously fit into their environment. Perhaps their successors will come to tower over their surroundings like their current French counterparts (cf. Schilgen 1990; Chaslin 1985).

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Appendix 1 Correlation matrices

Czechoslovakia, 1984 Social Class and Structure Survey, N=6171

cultural participation	1.00				
household income	.125	1.00			
respondent's education	.304	.193	1.00		
father's education	.257	.138	.383	1.00	
respondent's age	-.066	-.395	-.258	-.391	1.00

Denmark, 1976 Quality of Life Survey, N=5199

cultural participation	1.00				
household income	.182	1.00			
respondent's education	.389	.287	1.00		
father's education	.247	.130	.419	1.00	
respondent's age	-.113	-.114	-.301	-.116	1.00

Hungary, 1982 Survey of Social Stratification, N=2190

cultural participation	1.00				
household income	.310	1.00			
respondent's education	.580	.430	1.00		
father's education	.440	.180	.600	1.00	
respondent's age	-.150	-.030	-.380	-.300	1.00

Netherlands, 1977 Life Situation Survey, N=4159

cultural participation	1.00				
household income	.327	1.00			
respondent's education	.444	.408	1.00		
father's education	.359	.286	.429	1.00	
respondent's age	-.257	-.287	-.254	-.272	1.00

United States, 1982 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, N=3500

cultural participation	1.00				
household income	.340	1.00			
respondent's education	.520	.480	1.00		
father's education	.270	.320	.440	1.00	
respondent's age	-.030	-.040	-.190	-.310	1.00

Appendix 2 Sources for crossings of education against theatergoing

Australia: Social Science Data Archive, Canberra, Ms. Roach.
Year: 1982. N = 823.

Austria: Oesterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, Mr. Klein.
Year: 1985. N = 529498.

Belgium: D. Naeyaert & V. Claes, *Vrijetijdsbesteding in Vlaanderen, deelrapport I.* Leuven, 1984. Year: 1983. N = 2276.

Canada: Département des Sciences du Loisir, Quebec, Mr. Pronovost.
Year: 1983. N = 2305.

Czechoslovakia: Federal Statistics Office, Mr. Titerova.
Year: 1980. N = 35147.

Denmark: Statistics Denmark, Mr. Hostrup-Pedersen. Year: 1986. N = 1916.

Estonia: Department of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, Mr. Rannik.
Year: 1985. N = 1736.

Finland: Finnish Centre of the International Theatre Institute, Ms. Suur-Kujala. Year: 1981. N = 2276.

France: Données Sociales, INSEE, Paris, 1984, pp. 509-512, in combination with *Pratiques culturelles des Français*, Ministère de la Culture, Paris, 1983, p. 413. Year: 1981. N = 3884.

Germany, Federal Republic: Zentral Archiv für Empirische Socialforschung, Mr. Weinen.
Year: 1985. N = 1986.

Hungary: Tarki, Survey of Social Stratification, Mr. Kolosi.
Year: 1982. N = 15838.

Netherlands: Social and Cultural Planning Office, Time Budget Survey.
Year: 1980. N = 2651.

Norway: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Mr. Henrichsen.
Year: 1983. N = 3853.

Poland: Polish centre of the International Theatre Institute, Ms. Majewska.
Year: 1979. N = 19104.

Sweden: Statistics Sweden, Ms. Brivkalne. Year 1982. N = 6054.

United Kingdom: ESRC Data Archive, Essex, Mr. Banks. Year: 1983. N = 16024.

United States of America: ICPSR Data Archive, Michigan, Ms. Morris.
Year: 1982. N = 17229.

Appendix 3 Data matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Australia	46	35	45	39	44	258	0	0	1	8349
Austria	63	51	44	60	999	999	0	1	0	8230
Belgium	55	25	41	74	79	215	0	0	0	9228
Canada	24	36	38	47	57	241	0	0	1	11332
Czechoslovakia	60	28	41	39	61	193	1	0	0	7002
Denmark	48	17	31	71	54	223	0	1	0	9598
Estonia	37	50	999	999	92	232	1	0	0	6751
Finland	58	25	46	53	63	217	0	1	0	8393
France	63	44	42	51	63	255	0	0	0	9688
Germany, F.R.	53	36	37	81	68	234	0	0	0	9795
Hungary	65	105	29	35	109	187	1	0	0	5508
Netherlands	40	16	47	41	69	230	0	0	0	9036
Norway	40	34	42	45	62	212	0	1	0	11094
Poland	69	50	53	45	97	210	1	0	0	5006
Sweden	38	22	43	34	80	208	0	1	0	8863
United Kingdom	34	28	52	39	58	233	0	0	0	7975
United States	50	93	40	40	47	250	0	0	1	11404

1 = odds ratio (*10) theatergoing for those with post-secondary education versus all persons with a lower level of education
2 = odds ratio (*10) theatergoing for persons with primary education only versus all persons with a higher level of education
3 = step parameter (*100) for educational heterogamy
4 = odds ratio (*10) social mobility
5 = income share of poorest 20% of households
6 = income share of richest 10% of households
7 = communist government (0 = no, 1 = yes)
8 = social democratic government (0 = no, 1 = yes)
9 = immigration (0 = no, 1 = yes)
10 = gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars
missing values: 999